An Interview with Robert Crease

nn nnQuestion: As philosophers, why are you interested in the topic of expertise?nn nnCrease and Selinger: The question of expertise—its nature, scope, and application—is one of the most urgent of all contemporary issues. Of course, the Western philosophical tradition has long acknowledged that expertise is a significant topic of inquiry. Plato’s discussions of techné and of the difference between philosophy and sophistry are best characterized as discussions of expertise.nnBut what makes expertise a pressing matter today is that experts shape not only professional disciplines but also everyday life. Collaborative science requires experts to trust one another, and politicians, judges, businesspeople, and ordinary citizens all rely on expert counsel for a variety ends. Many activities once left as a matter of nature or common sense to clan, community, or culture have now become the province of experts. In short, Neil Postman, a cultural critic, was right when he remarked: “Experts claim dominion not only over technical matters, but also over social, psychological, and moral affairs. There is no aspect of human relations that has not been technicalized and therefore relegated to the control of experts.” Although our increased dependence on experts does not need to be viewed as intrinsically problematic, it is undeniable that experts have become the object of widespread controversy and hostility. We’re interested in this fascinating state of affairs. We want to find a way to critically discuss the implications of experts being indispensable, even though they generate both trust and skepticism.nnQ: Does your book offer practical strategies for effectively coping with experts?nnCrease and Selinger: Some of the authors in the volume do provide practical suggestions for how to select and contest experts. Alvin Goldman, for instance, has many interesting things to say about how to assess an expert’s track record. Paul Feyerabend presents several suggestions for how to reform science education. But our main goal was not to write a how-to manual. The issues surrounding expertise are simply too complicated to be dealt with in this manner. We take what we consider to be the necessary first step in clarifying what expertise is.nnOur primary aim is to present a framework for thinking critically about experts and expertise. Before the publication of our volume, these issues were entertained in different philosophical arenas—including philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy—but no one was focusing on the commonalities that underlie such seemingly diverse endeavors. Taken collectively, our contributors undermine many commonly held assumptions about experts and expertise. In particular, we want to show attempts to understand how experts can be biased. Experts sometimes appeal to the “objectivity” of “scientific” knowledge in order to silence alternative perspectives—perspectives that should be accorded moral, political, and even epistemic authority.nnWe believe that in order to facilitate more fruitful relations with experts across the various fields and disciples, it is first necessary to entertain the novel perspectives that our contributors provide. Experts may come in different shapes and stripes, but there are a number of general questions that have broad application. For example, what models apply to the reasoning process of experts? What is the logic of an appeal to expert authority? What is the social character of expertise? Are there epistemic openings that might make it possible for laypeople to critique expert advice?nnQ: A significant amount of media attention is currently being given to political issues surrounding expertise. How does your book address this problem?nnCrease and Selinger: There are many ways in which expertise can be politicized. Some chapters in the book, including the ones by John Hardwig and Steve Fuller, address cognitive authority and deference in broad strokes; such interventions crystallize fundamental issues and their implications for individuals and groups. Other chapters target social and political problems in specific contexts. Stephen Turner, for example, explores the implications, apparent contradictions, and possible rapprochement between liberal democracy and the reliance on expert knowledge. Scott Brewer raises the question of intellectual due process in the law by analyzing how judges and juries evaluate the trustworthiness of expert witness testimony. Edward Said discusses expertise in the humanities, and he identifies a dominant reason why current humanities “research” fails to effectively promote emancipatory politics. Peter Singer inquires into whether moral philosophers possess a form of moral expertise. Harry Collins and Robert Evans investigate the question of which groups should be entitled to contribute to decisions such as those about biotechnology research and AIDS treatments, at the technical level. And by clarifying how literary-aesthetic criticism differs from science criticism, Don Ihde sheds insight into why nonexperts find it difficult to criticize expert authority.nnQ: What contributions does your own work make?nnCrease and Selinger: Our work appears in the second section of the book, “Expertise and Practical Knowledge.” The different chapters that appear there include contributions by a range of theorists—Hubert Dreyfus, John Mix, Hélène Mialet, and Julia Annas—who study the unique kind of practical knowledge that experts exhibit. Whereas Mialet uses sociological and anthropological tools to clarify how scientists like Stephen Hawking become identified as creative geniuses, we draw from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology to clarify something more basic—namely, how universal structures of embodied cognition and affect influence how experts think, perceive, and judge. Although it may appear that experts in one field have little in common with experts in other fields, we try to discern how much of a general orientation toward acquiring and displaying skill is attributable to the ways in which our living bodies ultimately ground all forms of human knowledge.nn